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The Interaction of 
Domestic Anti-Avoidance 
Rules with Tax Treaties 
(with special references 
to the BEPS project) 
Tax avoidance schemes, including cross-border tax avoidance schemes, are counteracted 
at the domestic law level through the application of domestic anti-avoidance rules such 
as judicial doctrines, statutory general anti-avoidance rules or statutory specific anti-
avoidance rules. The issue then arises as to what is the impact of tax treaties on such 
domestic anti-avoidance rules. In general, it is accepted that tax treaties are rules that 
limit domestic law and if a conflict arises between the domestic law and tax treaty – the 
latter prevails. However, whether this position is correct with respect to domestic anti-
avoidance rules is highly questionable, especially, in light of the controversial update to the 
OECD Commentary in 2003, the update to the UN Commentary in 2011 and the OECD/G20 
BEPS deliverables. Accordingly, in this work, the author analyses the interaction of domestic 
anti-avoidance rules with tax treaties, in particular, the question of whether the effects 
of applying domestic anti-avoidance rules, from a source or residence States perspective, 
can be curtailed by tax treaties. The analysis takes into consideration the various changes 
proposed by the BEPS Action Plan, notably, Action 6 on preventing treaty abuse and Action 
15 on the Multilateral Convention. Moreover, the thesis makes policy recommendations in 
the form of treaty provisions that States can incorporate in their tax treaty network in 
order to ensure that conflicts do not arise between domestic anti-avoidance rules and tax 
treaties.
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 Introduction    1.
1.1. Cross border tax avoidance   
1. Cross border tax avoidance1, which, particularly leads to BEPS is a 
problem for every State2 because it adversely affects a tax system3.  This is 
mainly because tax avoidance practices are contrary to “fiscal equity, have 
serious budgetary effects and distort international competition and capital 
flows”4.  
 
2. At the outset, it should be noted that tax avoidance does not mean tax 
evasion. There is general agreement that tax evasion5 refers to criminal 
activity that is punishable by criminal sanctions as it involves the use of 
illegitimate means to evade the payment of tax6. Tax avoidance, on the other 
 
1  Also known as “aggressive tax planning” or” unacceptable tax planning”. 
LAMPREAVE, Avoidance, p. 50.    
2  ARNOLD, 2003 changes, p. 244.  
3  PREBBLE, PREBBLE, Tax Avoidance, p. 22; THURONYI, Comparative tax, p. 151.   
4  OECD, Tax Evasion Report, Para. 10.  
5  Also known as “tax fraud”. LAMPREAVE, Avoidance, p. 50. 
6  Commentators: THURONYI, Comparative tax, p. 157; LAMPREAVE, Avoidance, p. 49; 
TOOMA, Thesis, p. 14; KARIMERI, Avoidance, p. 297; FREEDMAN, Interpretation, p. 
70; KELLOUGH, Tax Avoidance, p. 1821; LI, SANDLER, Abuse, p. 894; BAKER, Tax 
avoidance, pp. 6-9; FROMMEL, Avoidance, p. 57; SEELY, GAAR, p. 4. Courts: The 
ISC (Justice Reddy) has held that “tax evasion is illegal”. See ISC: Commercial Tax 
Officer v. MC Dowell and Company Limited, 1986 AIR 649 (SC), April 17th 1985; The 
UK HOL (Lord Goff) has held that tax evasion is a “label which is perhaps better kept for 
those transactions which are traditionally so described because they are illegal”. See UK 
HOL: Craven (Inspector of Taxes) v White, [1988] STC 476, July 21st 1988; The Privy 
Council in New Zealand has held that “Evasion occurs when the commissioner is not 
informed of all the facts relevant to an assessment of tax. Fraudulent evasion may lead to 
a criminal prosecution as well as reassessment”. See Privy Council: Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd, [1986] STC 548, October 20th, 1986; The 
ECJ has held that “tax evasion…is illegal”. See ECJ: Halifax plc and others v Customs 
and Excise Commissioners, Case No: C-255/02, February 21st 2006; The OECD considers 
tax evasion as a “term that is difficult to define but which is generally used to mean illegal 
arrangements where liability to tax is hidden or ignored, i.e. the taxpayer pays less tax 
than he is legally obligated to pay by hiding income or information from the tax 
authorities” OECD, Glossary of Tax Terms; The Committee of experts on international 
cooperation in tax matters provide that “Tax evasion is usually associated with the 
commission of a criminal offense. It can be considered to consist of willful and conscious 
non-compliance with the laws of a taxing jurisdiction which can include a deliberate 
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hand, can be distinguished from tax evasion7. The key distinction is that tax 
evasion is illegal whereas tax avoidance is not8. 
 
3. Tax avoidance is not synonymous with tax mitigation9 either but the 
distinction between them is much harder to define. Tax mitigation can be 
defined as a reduction in tax in such a way that the taxing legislation clearly 
encourages or permits10. In contrast, tax avoidance seems to exist somewhere 
between tax evasion and tax mitigation and is generally understood to mean 
a reduction in tax in such a way that the transaction undertaken by a taxpayer 
   
concealment of facts from revenue authorities. Tax evasion is an action by which a 
taxpayer tries to escape legal obligations by fraudulent or other illegal means. It may 
result from the evasion of tax on income that arises from illegal activities, such as 
smuggling, drug trafficking, and money laundering. In a broader sense, tax evasion may 
also encompass a reckless or negligent failure to pay taxes legally due, even if there is no 
deliberate concealment of income or relevant information. Notwithstanding unintended 
evasion normally leads to only a tax payment with interest and penalties”. See 
COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS, Tax evasion, Para. 71.  
7  However, it has been argued that the distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion is 
blurred for the tax authorities as tax avoidance has been treated as tax evasion. TLRC, 
Countering tax avoidance, p. 10; COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS, Tax evasion, Para. 73.  
8  Commentators: THURONYI, Comparative tax, p. 157; LAMPREAVE, Avoidance, p. 49; 
TOOMA, Thesis, p. 14; KARIMERI, Avoidance, p. 297; KELLOUGH, Tax Avoidance, 
p. 1821; FROMMEL, Avoidance, p. 57; SEELY, GAAR, pp. 4-6; ARNOLD, 2003 
changes, p. 244; STRENG, YODER, JAAR, p. 599. Courts: The ISC (Justice Reddy) has 
held that “Tax avoidance, it seems, is legal”. See ISC: Commercial Tax Officer v. MC 
Dowell and Company Limited, 1986 AIR 649 (SC), April 17th 1985; The ECJ has held 
that “With respect to the notion of tax avoidance in the United Kingdom, it is legal”.  See 
ECJ: Halifax plc and others v Customs and Excise Commissioners, Case No: C-255/02, 
February 21st 2006, footnote 72; The OECD considers tax avoidance as a “term that is 
difficult to define but which is generally used to describe the arrangement of a taxpayer's 
affairs that is intended to reduce his tax liability and that although the arrangement could 
be strictly legal it is usually in contradiction with the intent of the law it purports to 
follow” OECD, Glossary of Tax Terms; The Committee of experts on international 
cooperation in tax matters provide that “Tax avoidance… involves the attempt to reduce 
the amount of taxes otherwise owed by employing legal means. Tax avoidance occurs 
when persons arrange their affairs in such a way as to take advantage of weaknesses or 
ambiguities in the tax law. Although the means employed are legal and not fraudulent, the 
results are considered improper or abusive”. See COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS, Tax 
evasion, Para. 73. 
9  Also known as “tax planning” or “acceptable tax avoidance”. LAMPREAVE, Avoidance, 
p. 49.  
10  PREBBLE, PREBBLE, Tax Avoidance, p. 22; THURONYI, Comparative tax, p. 156; 
LAMPREAVE, Avoidance, p. 49; TOOMA, Thesis, p. 17; ITP, Fundamentals, pp. 51-53; 
BAKER, Tax avoidance, p. 9; SEELY, GAAR, pp. 4-6.         
1. Introduction  5 


falls within the letter of the law but runs counter to its spirit and purpose11. 
Courts have generally provided a similar distinction. To illustrate, Lord 
Templeman in the Challenge Corporation case12 outlined the difference 
between tax avoidance and mitigation. He defined tax mitigation as 
occurring “where the taxpayer obtains a tax advantage by reducing his 
income or by incurring expenditure in circumstances in which the taxing 
statute affords a reduction in tax liability”. In contrast, tax avoidance arises 
“when the taxpayer reduces his liability to tax without involving him in the 
loss or expenditure which entitles him to that reduction. The taxpayer 
engaged in tax avoidance does not reduce his income or suffer a loss or 
incur expenditure but nevertheless obtains a reduction in his liability to tax 
as if he had”. Likewise, Lord Nolan in the Willoughby case13 outlined the 
difference between tax avoidance and mitigation by providing that “The hall 
mark of tax avoidance is that the taxpayer reduces his liability to tax without 
incurring the economic consequences that Parliament intended to be 
suffered by any taxpayer qualifying for such reduction in his tax liability. 
The hall mark of tax mitigation, on the other hand, is that the taxpayer takes 
advantage of a fiscally attractive option afforded to him by the tax 
legislation, and genuinely suffers the economic consequences that 
Parliament intended to be suffered by those taking advantage of the 
option”14.  
 
 
11  PREBBLE, PREBBLE, Tax Avoidance, p. 22; THURONYI, Comparative tax, p. 156; 
LAMPREAVE, Avoidance, p. 50; TOOMA, Thesis, p. 17; ITP, Fundamentals, pp. 51-53; 
BAKER, Tax avoidance, p. 9. 
12  See Privy Council, New Zealand: Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge 
Corporation Ltd, [1986] STC 548, October 20th 1986.  
13  UK HOL: Inland Revenue Commissioners v Willoughby and related appeal, [1997] STC 
995, July 10th 1997.   
14  The OECD has put forward a similar distinction. OECD, Tax Evasion Report, Annex II; 
The Committee of experts on international cooperation in tax matters provide that “Many 
countries make a distinction between acceptable tax avoidance and unacceptable tax 
avoidance. Unacceptable tax avoidance is achieved by transactions that are genuine and 
legal but involves deceit or pretense or sham structures; it is an indirect violation or an 
improper use of the tax laws or treaties. Acceptable tax avoidance methods or tax 
planning however reduces tax liability through transaction or other activities that are 
intended by legislation”. See COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS, Tax evasion, Para. 74.     
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1.2. The response to cross-border tax avoidance at 
the domestic tax law level: Domestic anti-
avoidance rules    
1.2.1. Introductory comments  
4. Domestic anti-avoidance rules are rules of domestic tax law that are 
intended to curb avoidance of tax (including avoidance of tax in cross-border 
situations)15. The rules can either be established through judicial precedent16 
or introduced by the legislature in statutory law17.  
1.2.2. The judicial response to tax avoidance 
5. It is fair to say that tax avoidance thrives on the literal interpretation of 
the tax legislation18. Thus, in order to strike down a tax avoidance scheme a 
literal interpretation of the legislation should be discounted. In this respect, it 
should be noted that a courts approach towards statutory (tax legislation) 
interpretation is of primary importance as the approach adopted by courts 
gives an indication as to how restraining or accommodating the legal climate 
of a State is vis-à-vis tax avoidance19. Generally, if a court adopts an 
approach to interpreting tax legislation, which takes into consideration the 
purpose or intention behind it then such an approach will less likely leave 
room for tax avoidance. On the other hand, if a court disregards the purpose 
or intention of the legislation in the interpretation process then such an 
approach will more likely foster tax avoidance20. While courts in several 
jurisdictions consistently recognize the right of taxpayers to avoid taxes by 
means that are within the law21 – they have nonetheless also found that tax 
 
15  GERZOVA, POPA, Anti Avoidance, p. 421.  
16  The question arises as to whether it is possible for Courts to develop anti-avoidance rules 
or doctrines. The author submits that the answer to this question varies from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction. Generally, in the US, it has been contended that no constitutional rule has 
prohibited the courts from developing anti-avoidance rules. However, in other 
jurisdictions such as Canada, it is contended that courts cannot create anti-avoidance 
rules. ZIMMER, JAAR, pp. 40-41. 
17  MICHEL, Anti Avoidance, p. 414.  
18  FREEDMAN, Interpretation, p. 63; FREEDMAN, Tax Avoidance, p. 1039.    
19  PEREZ, BAEZ, 2003 changes, pp. 139-143.           
20  THURONYI, Comparative tax, p.151; KARIMERI, Avoidance, p. 298; ZIMMER, JAAR, 
p. 37.   
21  VOGEL, Commentary, p.116; VOGEL, 2015 Commentary, p.124; ZIMMER, JAAR, p. 
47. 
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laws should be interpreted so as to prevent their avoidance by the use of 
transactions that have no economic or commercial or business rationale. 
Thus, through their process of statutory interpretation, courts tend to develop 
judicial anti-avoidance doctrines to curb tax avoidance. The most common 
judicial doctrines applied by Courts are the “sham”, “simulation”, 
“substance over form”, “economic substance”, “step transaction”, “fraus 
legis”, “business purpose” or “abuse of rights” doctrines. These doctrines 
attempt to interpret the tax legislation in manner, which curtails tax 
avoidance. However, it should be noted that no State applies all of these 
doctrines nor are they applied consistently from one State to another.  
1.2.3. The legislative response to tax avoidance 
6. Once the legislature identifies a tax avoidance scheme, the most 
common response is to introduce a SAAR that combats that particular tax 
avoidance transaction 22 . However, a common outcome following the 
enactment of a SAAR is that taxpayers, more often than not, find new 
avoidance opportunities not curtailed by such SAARs. Accordingly, as a 
general measure to counter tax avoidance, States may introduce a statutory 
GAAR. Though similar to judicial anti-avoidance doctrines, there is 
considerable variation in the form that the statutory GAARs take. 
Nevertheless, the various forms have approximately the same effect in the 
sense that the statutory GAAR is a tool to deny the tax benefits of tax 
avoidance transactions or arrangements believed not to have any commercial 
substance or business purpose23. Many States currently have SAARs in place 
as opposed to statutory GAARs24 but this trend may change in light of 
international developments, especially, the OECD’s BEPS project. 
  
 
22  EY, GAAR, p. 2.  
23  EY, GAAR, p. 2.  
24  EY, GAAR, pp. 4-9. 
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1.3. Tax treaties  
1.3.1. The residence vs source principle   
7. In general, States use the “residence” concept to tax their taxpayers 
(natural or juridical persons) on a worldwide income basis (or at least for 
some income categories). The right to tax on a worldwide basis stems from 
the fact that a resident taxpayer has close personal and economic ties to that 
country. Similarly, States use the “source” concept to tax non-residents. The 
right of the source State to tax on a limited basis stems from the fact that 
such a taxpayer derives income from the territory of that country. Thus, 
more often than not, when a resident of one country derives income from 
another country, both the residence and source States exercise their taxing 
rights over that item of income thereby giving rise to double taxation25.  
1.3.2. Types of double taxation   
8. Double taxation, in cross-border scenarios, can either be juridical or 
economical double taxation. Juridical double taxation is defined as “the 
imposition of comparable taxes in two (or more) States on the same taxpayer 
in respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods” 26 . 
Conversely, economic double taxation is defined as a situation wherein “two 
different persons are taxable in respect of the same income or capital” 27. 
Such double taxation can have a harmful effect on the movement of persons, 
capital, goods, services and technology between countries.  
1.3.3. Tax treaties: Their role and structure     
9. To reduce the harmful effects of double taxation, States enter into tax 
treaties. The role of these international agreements is to foster cross-border 
movement of persons, capital, goods, services and technology by eliminating 
double taxation28. Such agreements, which are primarily based on the OECD 
Model Convention (last updated in 2014 – all references in this thesis will be 
made to 2014 version of the OECD Model unless stated otherwise), “limit  
 
 
25  VOGEL, Commentary, p. 9; VOGEL, 2015 Commentary, p. 12.  
26  2014 OECD Comm. Introduction, Para. 1.   
27  2014 OECD Comm. Art 23. Para. 2.   
28  VOGEL, Commentary, p. 10; VOGEL, 2015 Commentary, p. 13.   
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the content of tax law of both contracting States”29 and, in general, do not 
impose taxes.    
 
10. The OECD Model consists of seven chapters. Chapter I deals with the 
“scope” (Art. 1-2) of the treaty. Chapter II deals with “definitions” (Art. 3-5) 
of treaty terms. Chapter III and IV, which deal with the core provisions of 
these agreements provide the “distributive rules” (Art. 6-22) that allocate 
taxing rights among States with respect to items of income and capital. 
Chapter V deals with rules for the residence State to provide “relief” from 
double taxation by either utilizing the exemption method (Art. 23A) or credit 
method (Art. 23B). Moreover, Chapter VI contains “special provisions” that 
deal with non-discrimination (Art. 24), dispute resolution (Art. 25), 
exchange of information (Art. 26), assistance in collection of taxes (Art. 27), 
members of diplomatic missions and consular posts (Art. 28) and territorial 
extension (Art. 29). Finally, Chapter VII of the model contains provisions 
with respect to entry into force (Art. 30) and termination of a tax treaty (Art. 
31).  
1.4. Purpose of the thesis: to analyze the interaction 
of domestic anti-avoidance rules with tax 
treaties   
11. Tax avoidance schemes, including cross border tax avoidance schemes, 
are counteracted at the domestic law level through domestic anti-avoidance 
rules such as judicial doctrines; statutory GAARs and SAARs. The purpose 
of this thesis is to analyse the impact of tax treaties on such domestic anti-
avoidance rules as it is generally accepted that tax treaties are rules that limit 
domestic law and if a conflict arises between the domestic law and tax treaty 
– the latter prevails30. However, whether this position is correct, especially 
with respect to domestic anti-avoidance rules, is questionable. Accordingly, 
the thesis discusses the interaction of domestic anti-avoidance rules with the 
provisions of tax treaties to ascertain if a conflict exists and the extent to 
which such domestic rules are limited by tax treaties.  
  
 
29  VOGEL, Commentary, p. 20; VOGEL, 2015 Commentary, p. 22.  
30  VOGEL, Commentary, p. 20; VOGEL, 2015 Commentary, p. 22; VAN RAAD, 
Fundamental rules, pp. 587-590.   
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1.5. Previous studies on this topic   
12. The thesis topic has been discussed and debated by the OECD and the 
UN on several occasions and the view of these international organizations 
has evolved over a period of time (from 1961 – 2015: see chapter 8). The 
topic has also been discussed at several IFA congresses. For instance, it was 
briefly discussed as part of a congress subject during the 37th IFA congress 
held in Venice (1983)31. Thereafter, the topic was discussed in a detail at a 
seminar held during the 48th IFA congress in Canada (1994)32. The topic 
was, once again, briefly touched upon in the 56th IFA congress held in Oslo 
(2002)33. Subsequently, it was discussed and debated as part of a congress 
subject during the 64th IFA congress held in Rome (2010)34. In addition, 
several commentators have explored the topic in books 35  or articles36 . 
However, to date, no thesis has been published which exclusively deals with 
this subject in a holistic manner. In 2013, the OECD launched its project on 
BEPS37. It is reasonable to predict that pursuant to this project several States 
will introduce domestic anti-avoidance rules or restore the effectiveness of 
existing anti-avoidance rules to counteract BEPS 38 . Accordingly, it is 
important to analyse whether tax treaties might curtail such domestic 
measures.       
1.6. Thesis methodology and structure  
13. The thesis analyses the interaction of domestic anti-avoidance rules with 
tax treaties. Clearly, all the domestic anti-avoidance rules of all States cannot 
be analysed. Consequently, the author has restricted himself to analyzing 
only domestic anti-avoidance rules that can be used to counteract cross-
border tax avoidance schemes. Accordingly, the questions arise as to what 
the typical cross border tax avoidance schemes are and what are the most 
 
31  UCKMAR, Tax Avoidance. 
32  IFA, Abuse. 
33  ZIMMER, JAAR. 
34  VAN WEEGHEL, Tax Avoidance. 
35  For instance, see DE BROE, Thesis; VAN WEEGHEL, Thesis; ARNOLD, VAN 
WEEGHEL, Abuse.     
36  For instance, see ARNOLD, 2003 changes; PEREZ, BAEZ, 2003 changes; MARTIN 
JIMENEZ, 2003 changes.  
37  2013 OECD, Addressing BEPS. 
38  2013 OECD, Addressing BEPS, p. 10.  
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common domestic anti-avoidance rules that can be used to counteract such 
schemes? These questions are dealt with in the second part of the thesis. 
This part starts by providing a general overview of the types of schemes that 
taxpayers undertake to reduce the source or the residence State’s tax base 
(see chapter 2). Thereafter, this part provides a comparative overview of the 
judicial doctrines, statutory GAARs or SAARs that are applied by the source 
or residence States to counteract cross-border tax avoidance schemes. A 
comparative analysis is essential as the scope; application and outcome of a 
domestic anti-avoidance rule can vary significantly from one jurisdiction to 
another. This part also lays down the method for ascertaining the “effect” of 
applying domestic anti-avoidance rules (see chapter 3). Later on in the 
thesis, these effects, applicable from the source or residence State’s 
perspective, are tested against the provisions of tax treaties to ascertain 
whether a conflict arises or not. Of course, it is impossible to compare the 
tax systems of all States. Thus, the comparative analysis is restricted to 
domestic anti-avoidance rules that are applied in cross-border scenarios in 
both common law States (such as Canada, India, USA and UK) and civil law 
States (such as France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland)39.  
 
14. As the thesis analyses the interaction of domestic anti-avoidance rules 
with tax treaties, as an initial step, it is essential to examine the relationship 
between tax treaties and domestic law or tax law (as domestic anti-avoidance 
rules are a part of domestic tax law). In particular, the question arises as to 
how tax treaties are incorporated in domestic law so as to apply to a taxpayer 
and, when applied, how do States resolve conflicts between their domestic 
law and tax treaty law? Ideally, if a conflict arises the tax treaty prevails as it 
can be considered to be “lex specialis”. However, do all States agree with 
this position, especially with respect to posterior domestic law rules? A 
related concern is the issue of treaty override: essentially, can States override 
their treaty obligations? Does such an override conflict with the provisions 
of international law, in particular, Art. 26 and Art. 27 VCLT? What remedies 
are available to the compliant States? This analysis lays down the basis for 
examining whether the application or introduction of a posterior domestic 
anti-avoidance rule can be considered to be a treaty override or not? These 
issues are explored in the third part of this thesis (see chapter 4).  
 
 
39  ZIMMER, JAAR, p. 22.   
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15. Also, prior to analysing the interaction of domestic anti-avoidance rules 
with tax treaties, it is essential to lay down the basis for tax treaty 
interpretation. This is examined in the fourth part of this thesis. It is well 
accepted that the VCLT governs the interpretation of treaties. Nevertheless, 
the question arises as to the extent to which the VCLT’s interpretation 
principles, found in Art. 31 and Art. 32, are relevant for the interpretation of 
tax treaties? (see chapter 5). The majority of the tax treaties in the world are 
based on the OECD Model. Further, it is widely accepted that the OECD 
Commentary plays an important role in the interpretation of a tax treaty 
based on the OECD Model. Accordingly, the role of the OECD Commentary 
in the tax treaty interpretation process needs to be determined as the OECD’s 
position on the interaction of domestic anti-avoidance rules with tax treaties 
has evolved over a period of time. Even the impact of the UN Commentary 
that accompanies the UN Model (last updated in 2011 – all references in this 
thesis will be made to the 2011 version of the UN Model unless stated 
otherwise) needs to be examined. This is because, at the moment of writing 
this thesis, the view expressed in the UN Commentaries on the interaction of 
domestic anti-avoidance rules with tax treaties was more comprehensive and 
structured than that in the commentaries to the OECD Model. Also, the 
commentary in the BEPS 2014 report on preventing tax treaty abuse 
(hereafter “2014 TTA report”) as well as the BEPS 2015 report on 
preventing treaty abuse (hereafter “2015 Final TTA report”) is inspired by 
the UN Commentary (see chapter 6). Even though the provisions of the 
VCLT govern the interpretation of tax treaties, a tax treaty cannot be viewed 
in isolation from domestic law. This is because several provisions of tax 
treaties, notably Art. 3(2) of the OECD Model, provide that treaty terms 
have to be interpreted in light of the relevant domestic law. An analysis of 
Art. 3(2) is essential for this thesis in order to determine the extent to which 
such domestic law definitions can be incorporated into a tax treaty (see 
chapter 7).  
 
16. The fifth part, which is the core of the thesis, analyses the interaction of 
domestic anti-avoidance rules with tax treaties. The view of the OECD and 
the UN, as expressed, in various versions of the working documents, reports 
and commentaries is put forward. Furthermore, the view of the OECD, as 
provided in the 2014 TTA report and 2015 Final TTA report, is also 
discussed. The view of these international organizations is examined in 
chronological order as expressed in various statements issued in the period 
from 1961 to 2016 (see chapter 8). Thereafter, the author comments on 
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selected issues that arise from the views expressed by the OECD and UN 
that are relevant to the issue at stake. Notably, the author discusses the role 
of the OECD Commentary and UN Commentaries in interpreting previously 
concluded tax treaties (especially tax treaties concluded before 2003); the 
object and purpose of tax treaties; the guiding principle (the PPT rule too) 
and its various components; the saving clause; and the observations made by 
States to these Commentaries (see chapter 9). An analysis of these issues is 
essential in order to debate on the interaction of domestic anti-avoidance 
rules with tax treaties.  
 
17. It is contended that no conflict should arise between a tax treaty and a 
domestic anti-avoidance rule if the former contains a provision (safeguard 
clause) to preserve the latter. The author analyses whether this position is 
correct or not and the impact of such a position on other treaties concluded 
by the same State that do not contain such a clause (see chapter 10). It is also 
contended that a conflict does not arise between a tax treaty and a domestic 
anti-avoidance rule when the treaty contains an undefined term and that term 
is then defined pursuant to a domestic anti-avoidance rule as a result of Art. 
3(2) or a provision that refers to the domestic law. The author analyses 
whether this position is correct or not and puts forward the limits to such a 
position (see chapter 11).  
 
18. Thereafter, the author discusses the interaction of domestic anti-
avoidance rules with tax treaties. To elaborate, the effects of applying 
domestic anti-avoidance rules, as ascertained previously (see chapter 3), are 
tested against the provisions of tax treaties. To begin with, the author tests 
the interaction of sham/simulated transactions (see chapter 12) with treaty 
provisions. Then, the interaction of domestic anti-avoidance rules, when 
applied from the source State’s perspective, with treaty provisions is 
considered. Specifically, the domestic anti-avoidance rules that re-determine 
the taxpayer (see chapter 13), re-characterize an item of income (see chapter 
14), deny a treaty benefit (see chapter 15) or deny interest deductions (see 
chapter 16) are tested with tax treaties. Finally, the interaction of domestic 
anti-avoidance rules, when applied from the residence State’s perspective, 
and treaty provisions is examined. Specifically, domestic anti-avoidance 
rules that deem non-residents to be residents in a jurisdiction (see chapter 
17), impute income derived by a non resident taxpayer to a resident taxpayer 
(see chapter 18), deem a taxpayer to dispose of its assets prior to its 
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migration (see chapter 19) and deny relief from double taxation to a 
taxpayer (see chapter 20) are considered in the light of treaty provisions.  
 
19. It should be noted that the author follows a common structure in the 
aforementioned chapters to discuss the interaction of domestic anti-
avoidance rules with tax treaties (chapters 13-20). Each chapter starts by 
presenting the effect of the domestic anti-avoidance rule and puts forward a 
case study to demonstrate its applicability. Thereafter, the view expressed by 
the OECD, UN and Courts (from around the world)40 on the interaction of 
that domestic anti-avoidance rule with tax treaties is discussed. The author 
then provides his own view on the impact of tax treaties on the domestic 
anti-avoidance rule in question. He also comments on whether the 
introduction or application of the anti-avoidance rule, after the conclusion of 
a tax treaty, amounts to treaty override or not based on his previous findings 
(see chapter 4).     
 
20.  In the sixth part of the thesis, the author analyses the relationship 
between various domestic anti-avoidance rules and various treaty anti-
avoidance rules and finally presents a case study (from the source States 
perspective) to illustrate the interaction between domestic anti-avoidance 
rules and tax treaties, in particular, whether treaty SAARs or treaty GAARs 
prevent the application of domestic anti-avoidance rules (see chapter 21).  
 
21. It should be noted that the thesis deals with the interaction of domestic 
anti-avoidance rules with tax treaties. EU law that is relevant to taxes i.e. the 
fundamental freedoms (such as the free movement of workers, the freedom 
of establishment, the free movement of capital and the freedom to provide 
services), the EU directives (such as the Parent-Subsidiary directive, Interest 
and Royalties directive, the Merger Directive and the recently introduced 
Anti-Tax Avoidance directive) and the case law of the ECJ in tax matters 
will not be examined in detail. Nevertheless, as EU law does have an impact 
on the application of domestic anti-avoidance rules, a high level analysis of 
the interaction of domestic anti-avoidance rules with EU Law is undertaken 
for the sake of completeness in the seventh part of the thesis. Essentially, the 
limitations imposed by EU law are discussed (see chapter 22). 
 
40  In the author’s opinion, a decision rendered by the highest Court of State A, on a treaty 
concluded by State A, is not binding on a tax treaty concluded by State B with State C. 
Nevertheless, references can be made to such decisions to interpret the State B and State 
C tax treaty. See WARD, Courts, pp. 185-187. Also, see section 7.2.6.2.     
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22. Finally, in the eighth part of the thesis, the author concludes his main 
findings (see chapter 23) and provides model provisions that States can 
incorporate into their treaties (treaty policy) to ensure that conflicts do not 
arise between their domestic anti-avoidance rules (even those introduced 
after the conclusion of a treaty) and their tax treaties (see chapter 24). 
1.7. Limitations  
23. With respect to the research underpinning the analysis in the thesis, it 
should be noted that there was a language limitation. Given, the author’s 
Indian background, the author is fluent in English and Hindi. However, as 
the thesis also analyses the law and jurisprudence of non-English speaking 
countries, on several occasions the author could not find appropriate English 
translations of non-English literature or when the literature was sourced the 
translations (in the author’s view) were not appropriate. Also, tax law is a 
dynamic subject. While writing the thesis, the author observed that the 
domestic tax law (approach of the legislature and the judiciary) in several 
jurisdictions was changing rapidly. Accordingly, the domestic law and 
jurisprudence examined in chapter 3 represents material as available on Jan 
1st 2016 (nevertheless, at the time of the thesis defense, this chapter has been 
updated with recent scholarly literature). The analysis in the other chapters, 
especially in chapter 4 to chapter 24 is up to date and reflects material as 
available on June 7th, 2017 (including the BEPS outcome).  
 
 
Tax avoidance schemes, including cross-border tax avoidance schemes, are counteracted 
at the domestic law level through the application of domestic anti-avoidance rules such 
as judicial doctrines, statutory general anti-avoidance rules or statutory specific anti-
avoidance rules. The issue then arises as to what is the impact of tax treaties on such 
domestic anti-avoidance rules. In general, it is accepted that tax treaties are rules that 
limit domestic law and if a conflict arises between the domestic law and tax treaty – the 
latter prevails. However, whether this position is correct with respect to domestic anti-
avoidance rules is highly questionable, especially, in light of the controversial update to the 
OECD Commentary in 2003, the update to the UN Commentary in 2011 and the OECD/G20 
BEPS deliverables. Accordingly, in this work, the author analyses the interaction of domestic 
anti-avoidance rules with tax treaties, in particular, the question of whether the effects 
of applying domestic anti-avoidance rules, from a source or residence States perspective, 
can be curtailed by tax treaties. The analysis takes into consideration the various changes 
proposed by the BEPS Action Plan, notably, Action 6 on preventing treaty abuse and Action 
15 on the Multilateral Convention. Moreover, the thesis makes policy recommendations in 
the form of treaty provisions that States can incorporate in their tax treaty network in 
order to ensure that conflicts do not arise between domestic anti-avoidance rules and tax 
treaties.
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